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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status
Summary
This report provides background and current status information on the regimes
intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
missiles.  Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical
states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests.
Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in these goods and technologies
and to monitor their civil applications.  Congress may consider the efficacy of these
regimes in consideration of the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act,
as well as other proliferation-specific legislation in the 109th Congress.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive
multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and
domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries.  Since the dawn
of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has played a decisive role in developing the
regime.  While the regime enjoys almost universal international agreement opposing
the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to it have arisen in recent
years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003; and Pakistani scientists
sold nuclear technology illicitly to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  Efforts are
underway to strengthen national controls on nuclear exports and coordinate
interdiction efforts multilaterally.
The chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regimes contain
three elements:  the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group.  The informal
Australia Group coordinates export controls on CBW-related materials and
technology. Current Australia Group issues are expansion of membership, possible
transhipment of restricted commodities, and the Group’s relationship to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. After 25 years of negotiations, the CWC opened for signature
in January 1993 and entered into force in April 1997.  It prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, and mandates the
destruction of existing chemical weapon arsenals.  BWC states parties have not yet
been able to agree upon a verification protocol to be added to the Convention, which
remains without verification or enforcement provisions.
The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not on a treaty, but an informal
agreement called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  Created in 1987,
the MTCR’s goal is to limit the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear
weapons.  The regime has expanded from 7 to 34 partner countries and has modified
its guidelines to include missile systems for the delivery of chemical and biological
weapons.  The regime has no treaty or enforcement organization.  Although it is
thought to have been instrumental in blocking several missile programs, it has been
unable to stop North Korean missile development, production, and exports, or to win
the full cooperation of Russian and Chinese entities.
This report is updated annually.
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The United States has historically led the international community in
establishing regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and missiles.  The regimes and their member countries use cooperative and
coercive measures to achieve nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives.
Multilateral agreements and organizations are supplemented by strong bilateral
cooperation among key allies, unilateral political and economic actions, and recourse
to military operations should they become necessary.  Congress supports the
nonproliferation regimes primarily by providing statutory authority and funding for
U.S. participation, establishing policy, and mandating punitive actions to help
enforce the international standards set by the regimes.
The term “regime” often refers to the entire array of international agreements,
multilateral organizations, national laws, regulations, and policies to prevent the
spread of dangerous weapons and technologies.  The regime that has evolved to limit
the spread of nuclear weapons is the most extensive, followed by those dealing with
chemical and biological weapons, and then by the missile regime.  The difficulty of
producing nuclear weapons material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and
great awareness of nuclear weapons’ destructiveness together have been conducive
to creating a complex regime with widespread agreement on the priority of nuclear
nonproliferation.  Chemical weapons are easier to make and rely on readily available
precursors, and they are far less destructive.  Less is known about biological
weapons, but they also rely on widespread dual-use technology and efforts to build
a more extensive control regime are more recent.  Finally, there is no international
consensus on the danger of missile proliferation to support a nonproliferation treaty
or a binding regime with enforcement mechanisms.
A key aspect of all the regimes is their attempt to control exports of sensitive
goods and technologies through supplier agreements.  These are the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee for nuclear technology, the Australia
Group for chemical and biological weapons technology, and the Missile Technology
Control Regime.  In the last decade, these export control regimes have expanded their
membership, expanded and refined their control lists, and increased coordination
among member states. At the same time, however, the non-binding nature of some
of the regimes and growing resistance to them by certain countries, including some
regime members, limits their effectiveness.  A major dilemma is whether to include
new members, such as Russia and China, that are not U.S. allies and do not have
reliable export controls, or to limit membership to countries with excellent
nonproliferation credentials.  Regime members are afforded special access to
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1 For coverage of these subjects, see CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events, by Amy Woolf.
controlled technology by the other members, so this  issue also affects decisions on
whether to include non-allies.   Table 1 lists the proliferation control regimes, their
components and statutory authority.  There are many arms control treaties and other
activities that address aspects of WMD and  conventional weapons beyond the
regimes covered in this report.1 
Status and Trends
 The nonproliferation regimes have prevented many risky transfers over the
years. However, several factors undermine their effectiveness.  One is the difficulty
of addressing underlying motivations of countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).  Regional security conditions as well as the desire to compensate
for other countries’ superior conventional or unconventional forces have been
common motivations for WMD programs.  Some countries may want WMD to
dominate their adversaries.  Prestige is another reason why certain countries seek
WMD.  Another factor working against the regimes is the steady diffusion of
technology over time — much of the most significant WMD technology is 50 years
old, and growing access to dual-use equipment makes it easier for countries or groups
to build their own WMD factories from commonly available civilian equipment.
There are at least two problems common to all of the nonproliferation regimes
— the lack of universal membership and gaps in verification.  Of course, a treaty can
work well without 100% membership or 100% assurances.  However, in some cases,
states outside the regimes have caused considerable concern in the past.  In the
nuclear regime, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not members of the NPT.
Apart from diplomatic questions about how to treat their status as states with nuclear
weapons not sanctioned by the NPT, they are not bound by that treaty’s prohibition
on sharing nuclear technology.  They also not members of the export control groups.
The international community seems to be at a loss for how to bring these states into
the nonproliferation regimes without tacitly agreeing to their acquisition of nuclear
weapons.  The revelations in 2003 and 2004 of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s black
market nuclear sales have galvanized the international community to examine
strengthening implementation of national export controls and interdiction, but the
fact remains that Pakistan, as a country, is not bound by the NPT.
In the CBW area, some states suspected of having military programs are still
outside the treaty.  Within the treaties, there are some members (e.g., Iran under the
CWC and Russia under the BWC) suspected of continuing programs.  In the missile
area, although the Hague Code of Conduct has widespread membership, MTCR is
still not adhered to by many states (e.g., China, North Korea, Iran) that are
responsible for proliferating missile technologies.
Continued diplomatic support for the treaties may face some hurdles.  In the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, many non-weapons states link their continued
cooperation with progress in implementing Article VI of the treaty (steps toward
eventual nuclear disarmament by the five nuclear weapon states).  In recent years,
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several developments have generated criticism: the United States’ abrogation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, which many
criticize as having little real impact and no verification; the U.S. Senate’s rejection
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; failure to proceed on a fissile material
production cutoff treaty in Geneva; and perceived interest in new U.S. nuclear
weapons.  In May 2005, some of these issues may be raised at the NPT Review
Conference.
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In addition to a formal framework of control agreements, close political
relationships with key allies and other countries are very important for U.S. efforts
to counter the spread and the use of WMD.  Initiatives by allies, such as the G-8
Global Partnership to combat the spread of WMD, demonstrate resolve to tackle
specific proliferation problems.  In May 2003, President Bush launched the
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI (see description below).  Many of these
relationships, nonetheless, are strongly influenced by other political, military, and
economic issues that sometimes take precedence over proliferation concerns.  In
practice, nonproliferation competes with important policy objectives such as trade,
regional issues, and domestic political considerations, and uneven implementation
of nonproliferation policy can be the result.  In particular, it appears that the Bush
administration has elevated counterterrorism cooperation above nonproliferation
cooperation in a few cases. 
A more difficult challenge exists when key U.S. allies and friends seek WMD
and missiles of their own or transfer WMD technology.  In that circumstance, a
breakthrough in establishing trust and cooperation might ease some of the underlying
security concerns that motivate countries to acquire WMD or to transfer WMD
technology.  Perhaps the hardest challenge for nonproliferation policies is to reduce
the desire of  countries for weapons of mass destruction.  It is sometimes possible to
change regional security conditions through alliances, arms transfers, arms control,
or negotiations aimed at settling conflicts.  However, eliminating underlying
motivations takes time, and the next best option may be to delay WMD development
for as long as possible.  Libya’s decision in December 2003 to give up its nuclear,
chemical weapons, and missile programs is a good example of a state that apparently
decided the costs of WMD programs exceeded their benefits. 
Unilaterally, the United States uses sanctions to support its nonproliferation
objectives.  Various laws authorize or require the President to impose unilateral
sanctions on countries that acquire, use, or help other countries to obtain WMD or
missiles.  Sanctions can affect U.S. aid, cooperation, and impose restrictions on U.S.
technology exports.  The effectiveness of sanctions often depends on persuading
other countries to support or respect U.S. sanctions.  Even without multilateral
support,  sanctions can still highlight strong U.S. opposition to WMD proliferation.
However, strong sanctions are rarely  imposed on U.S. friends or allies that acquire
WMD.
Counterproliferation, Intelligence, and Deterrence
U.S. armed forces have developed programs to help prevent the spread of
WMD, to deter or prevent their use, and to protect against their effects.  Defense
cooperation and arms transfers to U.S. allies can ease concerns about security that
can lead them to consider acquiring WMD, and also signal potential adversaries that
acquisition or use of WMD may evoke a strong military response.  U.S. conventional
and nuclear military capabilities and the threat of retaliation help deter WMD attacks
against U.S. forces, territory, or allies.  Counterproliferation capabilities have been
expanded in recent years to include more advanced “passive” and “active” defense
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measures.  Passive counterproliferation tools include protective gear such as gas
masks and detectors to warn of the presence of WMD.  Active measures include
missile defenses to protect U.S. territory, forces, and allies; precision-guided
penetrating munitions and special operation forces to attack WMD installations; and
intelligence gathering and processing capabilities.  Intelligence is a particularly
critical element of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, without which many policy options
would not be possible.  Intelligence agencies track foreign WMD programs, monitor
treaty compliance, and attempt to detect transfers of WMD  goods and technology.
The U.S. cooperates with certain allies to prepare for  possible counterproliferation
actions.  Although counterproliferation has emerged as a main pillar of the Bush
administration strategy to combat WMD, political and technical hurdles (hidden
underground bunkers, locations near civilians, etc.) tend to make counterproliferation
a last resort, after other options have failed. 
One tool of counterproliferation that the Bush Administration has highlighted
has been interdiction of WMD-related equipment shipments at sea, on land, and by
air.  President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31,
2003.  PSI, described as an activity rather than an organization, aims to better
coordinate states’ efforts to interdict such illicit shipments, based on existing legal
authorities.2  More than 60 countries have expressed interest in cooperating in PSI.
Congressional Role
Congress has been actively engaged in nonproliferation legislation for close to
sixty years.  In addition to laws affecting diplomacy, treaty implementation and
military options, legislation effecting  restrictions on foreign aid, sanctions and export
controls help establish nonproliferation policy and congressional oversight of
executive branch nonproliferation policies. 
Congress enacted strict controls on nuclear energy and cooperation in the first
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.  By the 1950s, however, it became clear that the U.S.
nuclear weapons program needed materials from abroad and that pure denial of
materials and technology had neither stopped the Soviet Union nor the UK from
acquiring nuclear weapons.  The 1954 revision of the Atomic Energy Act reflected
a shift in strategy from that of prevention through denial to one of influence through
cooperation.  However, as allies planned to sell sensitive enrichment and
reprocessing equipment to states outside of the NPT in the 1970s (e.g., Pakistan,
South Korea, and Brazil), Congress reacted by passing several laws to slow down
nuclear commerce and implement sanctions against those states clandestinely
pursuing nuclear weapons.  Controls on exports of chemical and biological agents
with military applications and missiles have been regulated under the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) of 1968, and their dual-use technologies have been regulated
under the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and its predecessors, but these
controls were implemented relatively later in the 1980s.  Table 2 (pages 8-9) lists the
major U.S. laws enacted to limit the transfer of WMD and WMD technology.  Over
time, most laws have been amended to address the range of WMD threats, but there
are a few laws that address only one kind of weapon of mass destruction; some laws
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have focused on a proliferation threat from a particular country.  Nunn-Lugar-related
legislation and the Freedom Support Act address the range of WMD, but focus on
Russia and the NIS.  In addition, legislation related to Iran and Syria span the range
of WMD proliferation.  See Appendix B for relevant text from nonproliferation-
related legislation.
Organization of the Report
The following sections will describe the nuclear, biological, chemical, and
missile nonproliferation regimes.  Each section will include (a) a background section
with a brief history of the regime; (b) a section setting out the treaties and agreements
that authorize or affect the regime; (c) a brief description of how the regime is
implemented; (d) U.S. laws authorizing or affecting the regime; and (e) issues for 109th
Congress.  More detailed information on regime membership, specific provisions in
law and relevant executive orders are contained in appendices.
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Table 2. U.S. Legal Framework for Proliferation Control
Title Public Law Application Nuclear Chemical Biological Missiles TargetCountry Notes
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3 Prepared by Carl E. Behrens, Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division. 
4 See CRS Report RS21823, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime3
The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive
multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and
domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries.  Since the dawn
of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has played a decisive role in developing the
regime.  While the regime enjoys almost universal international agreement opposing
the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to it have arisen in recent
years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998; North Korea withdrew
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003; and Pakistani scientists
sold nuclear technology illicitly to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  Efforts are
underway to strengthen national controls on nuclear exports and coordinate
interdiction efforts multilaterally.
In 2004, there were five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia,
Great Britain, France, China), three de facto nuclear weapons states (India, Israel,
Pakistan), and one country — North Korea — that has probably secretly produced
enough plutonium for between two and eight bombs.  This is considerably less than
predicted 40 years ago, when President Kennedy warned of the possibility that, by
the 1970s, the United States could “face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-
five nations may have these weapons.” 
The nonproliferation regime has not stopped all proliferation, but it has helped
restrain nuclear ambitions and solidified an international norm of behavior strongly
condemning proliferation.  Many countries that could make nuclear weapons have
not, but some have at one time or another taken significant steps towards acquiring
a nuclear weapons capability.  Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, and South Korea all have had nuclear weapons
development programs.  Both Japan and Germany had nuclear weapons programs
during the Second World War, but did not succeed in making nuclear weapons before
their programs were halted at the end of the war.  Argentina, Brazil, South Korea,
Sweden, Taiwan, and South Africa abandoned their nuclear weapons programs and
joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.  Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as
former Soviet republics with inherited nuclear weapons on their soil, also opted to
join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.  Libya, despite its membership as a non-
nuclear weapon state in the NPT,  gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program
in December 2003.4
Only a few countries maintain an interest in developing nuclear weapons, but
it is difficult to predict how many countries or terrorist groups may in the future want
a nuclear weapons capability.  Some of the major challenges in preventing
proliferation will include 
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5 Previous proposals included a 1945 proposal by the United States, Britain, and Canada
proposed to establish a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to eliminate “the use of atomic
energy for destructive purposes,” a 1957 “package” of measures (from Canada, UK, France,
and United States) to the U.N. Disarmament Commission that included a commitment not
to transfer nuclear weapons, a 1964 program proposed by the United States for
nonproliferation.  See Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of
the Negotiations, 1990 edition, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 89.  
! controlling nuclear materials smuggling from the former Soviet
Union and other countries with weak controls, a task of greater
priority following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
! strengthening physical protection of all source and special nuclear
materials globally;
! strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards
system;
! negotiating with North Korea to verify and dismantle its nuclear
weapons program;
! restraining nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan;
! restraining nuclear programs in the Middle East, including those of
Israel and Iran; 
! preventing U.S. technology from aiding the development of WMD
and delivery systems in foreign countries;
! strengthening international verification and enforcement of
nonproliferation agreements. 
Treaties and Agreements
The NPT [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html]  is
the centerpiece of nuclear nonproliferation efforts .  Other relevant treaties include
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials.  In addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States has
also entered into bilateral agreements and initiatives, such as the G-8 Global
Partnership to Combat WMD.  Finally, actions the United States takes in related
areas of arms control may have an impact on the nonproliferation regime.
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1970.  It
took just three months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 for the
first proposals to emerge from governments to control the “destructive uses” of
nuclear energy.  It took twenty-five years, however, for the NPT to emerge as the
blueprint for nuclear nonproliferation.5  In 1968, the treaty demarcated nuclear-
weapon-states  from non-nuclear-weapon states by defining nuclear-weapon-states
as those states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.  This definition implied that there
would only ever be five “legitimate” nuclear-weapon-states — the United States,
Russia, Great Britain, France, and China.  All other states would join as non-nuclear
weapon-states, agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  In 2004, there were 187 parties to the NPT,
including all five nuclear weapons states.  Although Cuba signed the NPT in 2002,
North Korea withdrew from the treaty officially in April 2003. The NPT completed
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its 25-year initial life-span in 1995, at which time members voted to make the treaty
permanent. However, members convene every five years to review treaty
implementation; the next review conference will occur in May 2005 in New York.
The pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons is verified through the application
of “nuclear safeguards” measures.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
founded in 1957, devised a system of nuclear material accountancy coupled with
periodic and special inspections to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from
peaceful uses to military uses.  Each non-nuclear-weapon-state party to the NPT
must negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to submit all nuclear material in its
possession to regular inspections.6  After learning several lessons from Iraq’s and
North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programs, the IAEA launched a major effort to
strengthen its safeguards system (see below) in 1992.  
The incentive for non-nuclear-weapon-states to submit to inspections is a
promise by advanced nuclear countries to promote “the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.”7  The nuclear-weapon-states also agree to “pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament....”8
In 1995, NPT members voted to make the treaty permanent like many other
treaties.  The members also agreed on a stronger review process to oversee
compliance with the treaty.  However, many members of the NPT are dissatisfied and
the future of the treaty is not guaranteed. (see discussion of implementation)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1987.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppn.html]sets
international standards for nuclear trade and commerce.  The treaty had 104 parties
in 2004.   The Convention outlines security requirements for the protection of nuclear
materials against terrorism and provides for the prosecution and punishment of
offenders of international nuclear trade laws.  Parties to the treaty agree to report to
the IAEA on the disposition of nuclear materials being transported and agree to
provide appropriate security during such transport.
For several years, the United States has been trying to strengthen this treaty to
address the issue of nuclear terrorism by extending controls to domestic facility
security, not just transportation.  Amendments proposed thus far have included
extending the Convention’s scope to cover not only nuclear material in international
transport, but also nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport, as well
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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.  In the last 35 years, some states have
concluded treaties to declare their regions to be “nuclear-weapons-free.”  These
regions now include Latin America, the South Pacific,  Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco). [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//
tlatelolco.html].  This treaty establishes a nuclear-weapons free zone (NWFZ) in
Latin America. Protocol I of the treaty obligates non-Latin American countries that
have territories in the zone (U.S., U.K., Netherlands, France) to accept the provisions
of the treaty with respect to those territories.  Protocol II contains a negative security
pledge by the nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.) “not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty....”
In 1994, treaty holdouts Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed on, and in 1995 Cuba
signed the treaty (which entered into force for it in 2002).
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf331.shtml].  Eleven
nations of the South Pacific have established a NWFZ for their region which
prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons by its members and bans the
manufacture or permanent emplacement of nuclear weapons within the zone by
signatories outside of the Pacific region.  The treaty does not inhibit transit through
the zone by nuclear-armed or powered military ships or aircraft.  In 1996, the United
States, France, and Britain signed the protocols to the treaty, which are nearly
identical to those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.  Before signing the treaty protocols,
France conducted its last nuclear tests at its test site in French Polynesia.  The United
States is the only nuclear-weapon-state that has not ratified the protocol. 
African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties//pelindaba.html].  In April
1996, 53 countries signed the Treaty of Pelindaba, declaring Africa a NWFZ.  The
African NWFZ closely follows the models of the South Pacific and Latin American
zones, and thus was able to attract the support of the United States and other weapons
states after certain criteria were satisfied.  This nuclear weapon-free-zone is not yet
in force and the United States and Russia have not ratified the relevant protocol.
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).
[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc548.pdf].  A
group of 10 Southeast Asian nations declared a NWFZ for their region in late 1995
and the treaty entered into force in 1997. The United States and other weapons states
declined to sign the protocols to the zone because the treaty contained controversial
definitions of its members’ sovereignty over territorial seas.  The United States
maintains that the language of the treaty is inconsistent with the Law of the Sea and
could inflame territorial disputes as well as interfere with rights of passage.
Modifications of the language are under consideration. In 1999, China announced it
would sign the protocol but has deferred its signature.
Other Agreements.  The United States has concluded arrangements with
several states on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral basis in an effort to address
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specific programs.  In 1994, the United States signed the Agreed Framework with
North Korea (which was terminated in 2003).  In 2002, the United States initiated a
“10 plus 10 over 10" effort within the G-7 to provide additional funding for  nuclear
nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union (NIS), now called the G-8 Global Partnership to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction.  As noted earlier, the United States also created the Proliferation
Security Initiative in 2003.
The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework.  In October 1994, the United
States signed an agreement with North Korea to freeze its plutonium production
facilities (reactors and reprocessing plant) in exchange for assistance, and, eventually,
two 1000-megawatt, light water nuclear reactors.9  North Korea received shipments
of heavy fuel oil to compensate for energy that theoretically might have been
generated from the reactors it agreed to shut down.  The deal required North Korean
compliance with its full-scope safeguards agreement before completion of the new
reactors.  Such compliance hinged on several issues, including resolution of how
much undeclared plutonium North Korea might have separated prior to 1994.
Experts generally agree that the amount is at least sufficient for 1-2 bombs (about 12
kg).  
An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor
construction project.  KEDO negotiated several agreements with North Korea on the
legal, financial and territorial aspects of the project.  South Korea was to build the
reactors and pay for about 60-70% of the deal.  Japan and other countries were to pay
for the rest.  The United States payed for oil shipments and payed for storage of the
spent nuclear fuel rods that were removed from North Korea’s test reactor in 1994.
In October 2002, North Korea’s reported admission of a secret uranium
enrichment program set in motion a series of events that are similar to the 1994 crisis
from which the Agreed Framework emerged.  In December 2002, the United States
cut off its shipment of heavy fuel oil and pronounced that the Agreed Framework
would be terminated.  North Korea announced it would restart its plutonium
facilities, breaking seals and expelling IAEA inspectors at the end of December 2002.
In January 2003, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT, which
became effective in April 2003.  The Bush Administration has said it favors a
diplomatic solution and proposed Six-Party talks with North Korea (including the
United States, North Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea).  Although
several rounds have been held, none yet have yielded progress in disarming North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
  
CRS-15
10 See Fact Sheet on G-8 Summit, Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, June 27, 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House.
[http://usinfo.state.gov].
11 See CRS Report RL32359, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of
Options.
12 See [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32725.htm] for a State Department fact sheet on PSI.
13 In the early 1990s, a test ban and a treaty halting the production of nuclear material
(known as fissile material production cutoff treaty), were viewed as the next steps.  No
progress has been made to date on negotiating a production cutoff treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament.
14 CRS Issue Brief IB92099, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
G-8 Global Partnership.  At the summit held in June 2002 in Kananaskis,
Canada, G-8 members agreed to a Global Partnership to halt the spread of weapons
of mass destruction and related materials and technology.  The G-8 members agreed
to raise $20 billion over 10 years in nonproliferation assistance to Russia, of which
the United States committed to providing $10B.   Projects relating to disarmament,
nonproliferation, counterterrorism and nuclear safety will focus initially on Russia,
but the initiative will be open to other states as well.10  The Global Partnership
reiterated its commitment to these nonproliferation programs at the June 2004 Sea
Island summit, and also agreed to consider expanding the application of cooperative
threat reduction assistance to states outside the former Soviet Union.  This would
mirror U.S. efforts to expand its own cooperative threat reduction assistance to states
outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union, for example, Albania.11
Proliferation Security Initiative.  As noted earlier, President Bush
announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31, 2003 to improve
multilateral cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-
related materials at sea, on land, and in the air.  Administration officials have stressed
that PSI is an activity, not an organization.  The purpose is to strengthen the
enforcement of already-existing export controls associated with nonproliferation
treaties.  States agreed to a set of interdiction principles in Paris in September 2003.12
Related Arms Control Agreements.  Article VI of the NPT calls for an end
to the arms race and progress toward disarmament.  For many non-nuclear-weapon-
states, Article VI embodies the quid pro quo of the NPT — while non-nuclear-
weapon states give up their right to develop nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-states
agree to eventually disarm.   In the 1990s, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) was seen as the next step toward nuclear disarmament.13  By the mid-1990s,
all nuclear weapon states were observing a moratorium on testing, which the treaty
would have made permanent.  The parties completed negotiations and signed the
CTBT in 1996; President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate in September
1997 and in 1999, the Senate refused to give its advice and consent.14 
Unilateral and bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons have also been important
within the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as demonstrations of good
faith by the nuclear weapon states towards the eventual goal of disarmament.  In
January 2002, the Bush Administration released the results of its “Nuclear Posture
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Review,” announcing that U.S. nuclear planning would no longer address the
“Russian threat,” but would need to meet a range of threats from unspecified
countries.  The redirection would be accompanied by a large, unilateral reduction in
deployed nuclear weapons.  However, the new policy also included development of
a controversial missile defense capability, improving the nuclear weapons
“infrastructure” to allow resumption of testing, and possible development of new
weapons more rapidly.  Although the Administration statement did not indicate that
such activities were contemplated or necessary, the suggestion that they might be in
the future caused dismay in nonproliferation circles.15   In May 2002, Presidents Bush
and Putin signed what has become known as the Treaty of Moscow, which will
reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1700 and 2200
by 2012.16  This treaty has been viewed alternately by some observers as a step
toward nuclear disarmament and by others as a step back from nuclear disarmament,
since its reductions are not permanent and apply only to deployed forces rather than
the stockpile of weapons as a whole.
Finally, for many countries, the ABM Treaty was an important symbol of a
commitment by the United States and USSR to ratchet down the nuclear arms race,
and its June 2002 abrogation represents to some a setback in disarmament.  On the
other hand, some observers have argued that U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will
have little impact on other states’ nuclear force postures, including that of China.17
Implementing the Regime
Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is perhaps the most visible
aspect of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the success of nonproliferation efforts
relies on the sturdy functioning of national export control laws and implementation,
the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers’ Group multilateral coordination of
export controls, and effective  inspections conducted by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).  Equally important is the quid pro quo of technical
assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that the IAEA provides.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The IAEA, a U.N.-
affiliated international organization, was established in 1957 to “accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity,” and to
ensure “that assistance provided by it...is not used in such a way as to further any
military purpose.”18  With the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, it  performs the
dual missions of verifying NPT obligations and providing assistance in peaceful
nuclear technology to developing nations.  By 2003, the Agency had 137 member
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states and an annual budget of about $249 million.19  The IAEA safeguards system
monitors nuclear materials and technology to deter and detect diversions from
peaceful to military uses. 
The administrative structure of the Agency resembles that of the United Nations.
The General Conference includes all members and meets annually. The Board of
Governors has 35 members, nine of which are permanent advanced nuclear nations,
with the remaining Board members serving one-year terms as representatives of
regional nuclear interests. The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the Agency.
It is headed by the Director General, who is the chief policy-making official.  The
current Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, is an Egyptian diplomat who
previously served as head of the IAEA’s legal department. 
In over 25 years of inspections, Iraq was the first country to be declared in
violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement in 1991, followed just a few years later
by  North Korea.  These declarations, and the experience of accounting for past
nuclear activities in Iraq, South Africa, and throughout the former Soviet Union,
galvanized the world community to agree to strengthen the IAEA’s
inspection/safeguards system.  The IAEA developed a strengthened safeguards
program  (formerly called “93+2") to improve its ability to detect unreported nuclear
activities in non-weapon states.  The program includes 
! provision of intelligence information to the IAEA by member states
about suspect nuclear activities; 
! access for inspectors to any location on a timely basis; 
! new safeguards technology;
! measures to promote complete transparency and reporting of all
nuclear commerce. 
! sufficient financial resources to carry out the IAEA’s expanded
responsibilities.  
State parties to the NPT have been required to ratify new “model
protocol”agreements to their existing nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
On May 9, 2002, President Bush  submitted the U.S. model protocol agreement to the
Senate for its consent to ratification.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on ratification in 2004.  Ratification, according to some observers, may
present the United States with a stronger negotiating hand in persuading key states
to accept the protocol.  A continuing issue will be adequate funding for the IAEA
safeguards. The annual $89M safeguards budget is insufficient to carry out the
IAEA’s new responsibilities; the Agency estimates it typically spends about $104M
each year on safeguards, relying on extrabudgetary contributions.  Thus, the IAEA’s
ability to carry out its growing responsibilities and efforts to upgrade its safeguards
system continue to be limited by members’ reluctance to increase the IAEA budget.
Since September 11, 2001,  the IAEA has been promoting efforts to help prevent
terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear or
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radiological devices.  These have focused primarily on upgrading its assistance in
physical security, in locating orphaned radioactive sources, and in promoting
enhancement of the Convention on the Protection of Physical Security.  The IAEA
established a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in
2001 and an action Plan on Combating Nuclear Terrorism in 2002. 
In response to revelations in 2004 about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s
clandestine nuclear sales to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, IAEA Director General has
proposed seven steps to enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  These include
a five-year moratorium on construction of uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing facilities; conversion of nuclear reactors using highly enriched uranium
(HEU) to low-enriched uranium; making the Additional Protocol the verification
norm of the NPT; revisiting UN Security Council actions in response to a state’s
withdrawal from the NPT; universal implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1540; acceleration of Article VI actions by nuclear weapon states (toward
nuclear disarmament); and resolution of regional security tensions that give rise to
proliferation, including a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free-zone.20
The Zangger Committee.  In 1971, a group of seven NPT nuclear supplier
nations formed the Nuclear Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee,
to assist in restricting nuclear trade as called for in Article III of the NPT.21  In 1974,
the Zangger Committee compiled a list of nuclear export items that could be
potentially useful for military applications of nuclear technology.  The nuclear
suppliers agreed that the transfer of items on the list would “trigger” a requirement
for IAEA safeguards to assure that the items were not used to make nuclear
explosives.  The Zangger list included reactors, reactor components, and certain
nuclear materials such as heavy water.  In recent years, the list of controlled items has
been expanded and updated.  Membership is voluntary and implies no formal
commitments for enforcement of the guidelines.  In 2004, the Zangger Committee
had 35 members22 and continued to meet twice each year to exchange information
and upgrade its list of controlled commodities. 
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  Shaken by the 1974 test of a nuclear
explosive device by India, the major nuclear suppliers in 1975 established a set of
unpublished nuclear export guidelines.23  In 1978, the group, known as the London
Club, added new members and announced a common policy regarding nuclear
exports.  While the NPT’s Zangger list initially included only nuclear materials and
components used directly in weapons development, the London Club adopted  more
restrictive export control guidelines that included some dual-use items, with civil and
military applications.  The NSG guidelines called for suppliers to exercise restraint
regarding transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology, and required the
provision of physical security for transferred nuclear facilities and materials,
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acceptance of safeguards on replicated facilities (based on a design transferred from
a London Club member-state), and prohibitions against retransfer of nuclear exports
to third parties. 
Although NSG guidelines were in place, members took no further actions until
1991.  Concerned about Iraq’s successful procurement of dual-use items and
apparently inconsistent enforcement of nuclear export controls in several supplier
countries, the NSG convened in March 1991 for the first time since 1978 to update
its list of controlled commodities.  The expanded group agreed on new guidelines in
January 1992 for transfers of a wider range of nuclear-related, dual-use equipment,
material and technology and jointly adopted the longstanding U.S. policy of requiring
full-scope safeguards for all nuclear exports.  (Nations purchasing nuclear technology
must open all nuclear facilities to inspection, not just the facility in which an
imported item is used).24  By 2004, the NSG had expanded to 44 members.25
Some developing nations have objected to the work of the NSG because it
further divides the technologically advanced nuclear “haves” from the “have nots”
and creates additional obstacles to their access to nuclear technology.  A few
countries have turned to suppliers outside of the NSG (e.g., China ) to avoid the
requirement for  full-scope safeguards on nuclear exports.  The emergence of new
nuclear suppliers that do not subscribe to NSG guidelines undermines the efforts of
NSG members to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
The strengthening of NSG export policy after the Gulf War responded to
numerous examples of illegal, covert, and suspicious nuclear trade involving Western
firms and countries such as India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, South
Africa, and others.  These transfers underscored the limitations of voluntary export
controls, but they also motivated U.S. officials to push for further tightening of NSG
restrictions on world nuclear exports.  However, as a voluntary association, the NSG
has no formal administrative structure, no legal authority to influence the nuclear
trade policies of its members, and no formal enforcement mechanism. 
U.S. Government Organization.  The Departments of State, Energy,
Defense, Commerce and the intelligence community are all involved in the
formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.
! The National Security Council coordinates nonproliferation policy.
! The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department,
negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation, represents U.S.
nonproliferation interests with other states and international
organizations such as the IAEA, and administers some
nonproliferation assistance programs.
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! The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation
strategy and policy, and also administers Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs.
! The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to
support nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its
national laboratories. DOE also administers nonproliferation
programs to control fissile material in the former Soviet Union.
! The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports
subject to concurrence by the Department of State.
! The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use
exports as mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Act, which requires controls on “all export items, other
than those licensed by the NRC, which could be, if used for purposes
other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for
nuclear explosive purposes.”
! The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through
its Office of Foreign Assets Control, and enforces export control
through the U.S. Customs Service;
! The CIA has a Nonproliferation Center that coordinates intelligence
aspects of nonproliferation policy.
! Several interagency working groups coordinate the various
responsibilities for nonproliferation policy.  
Since September 11, 2001, significant U.S. government interest has focused on
counterproliferation programs — that is, military measures against weapons of mass
destruction.  Although the Department of Defense has had programs in place for
several years, efforts in this area have been renewed.  Counterproliferation includes
active and passive defenses to protect U.S. and allied troops, although protection
against nuclear weapons is far more difficult than protecting against chemical
weapons.  The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction described counterproliferation as including interdiction, deterrence,
defense and mitigation.26  Preemption is explicitly described as an option under
defense and mitigation policies.  Even before the release of the national strategy, the
Bush Administration attempted to make a case for preemptive strikes on Iraq’s WMD
capabilities.
U.S. Laws27
The main legislative pillars of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy are the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and the
Foreign Assistance Act 1961/Arms Export Control Act 1968. 
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).28  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
established legal authority for the commercial and military development of nuclear
energy.  It gave primary authority for the development and oversight of the U.S.
government’s nuclear programs to a civilian agency: the Atomic Energy Commission
(now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).  In 1974, these duties were divided
between the NRC and the Department of Energy.  A major purpose of the act was to
establish controls on the export of nuclear materials, goods, information, and
technology.  Under the AEA, the State Department must negotiate an agreement for
nuclear cooperation as a precondition for exports of sensitive U.S. nuclear technology
to any foreign country.  Each agreement must meet several standards outlined in the
AEA.  Moreover, the act contains penalties and restrictions for countries that do not
uphold the terms of nuclear agreements with the United States.  Congress reviews all
such agreements before they can enter into force.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).29  Congress and the
Carter Administration viewed U.S. leadership and control over the international
nuclear fuel cycle as an effective means of restraining the spread of uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities throughout the world.  Enrichment
and reprocessing technologies are key technologies for states aspiring to develop
nuclear weapons.  While reaffirming the U.S. commitment to be a reliable supplier
of nuclear technology and  fuels, the act established an important new requirement
for nations importing U.S. nuclear technology and materials: they must accept full-
scope safeguards on their entire nuclear program.  This standard was adopted by NSG
members in 1992.  The act also established a requirement of prior U.S. approval for
retransfers or reprocessing of material or equipment as well as to material produced
using U.S.-exported technology.  These measures gave the United States much more
control over the foreign uses of U.S.-origin nuclear material.
Title III of the NNPA includes such varied measures as requiring the
Department of Energy to obtain NRC licenses to distribute source and special
material and establishment of criteria for terminating nuclear exports from the United
States (which affects bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements) to include detonation
of a nuclear device, termination/abrogation or violation of IAEA safeguards, or
engaging in activities involving nuclear material which have significance in the
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices (covering a wide array of activities).
Additional prohibited acts included violating a nuclear cooperation agreement with
the United States; assisting a non-nuclear-weapon-state in activities involving nuclear
material that could potentially help in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear
explosive device; or enriching any U.S. source or special material without the
permission of the United States.  The NNPA requires (in Section 601) the President
to report annually to Congress on the Government’s efforts to prevent nuclear
proliferation. 
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Foreign Assistance Act/Arms Export Control Act (AECA.)30  The Arms
Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes U.S. Government military sales,
loans, leases, financing, and licensing of commercial arms sales to other countries.
The AECA coordinates such actions with other foreign policy considerations,
including nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for military
exports, sales, leases, loans, and financing.
! Section 3(f) (22 U.S.C. 2753(f)) prohibits U.S. military sales or
leases to any country that the President determines is in material
breach of binding commitments to the United States under
international treaties or agreements regarding nonproliferation of
nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special nuclear
material.  
! Section 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) prohibits exports or assistance in
exporting (financial or otherwise) munitions to countries that
provide support for terrorism.  Included in the definition of acts of
international terrorism are: “all activities that the Secretary [of State]
determines willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of
nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully aid or
abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special
nuclear material.” The President can rescind a determination or
waive sanctions if essential to the national security interests of the
United States.
! Section 101 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa) (formerly section 669 of the FAA)
prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to countries that
deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or
technology unless the supplier agrees to place such under safeguards
and the recipient has full-scope safeguards.  The President, who
makes the determination, can waive sanctions if they will have a
serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, given assurances that
the recipient will not acquire, develop, or assist others in acquiring
or developing nuclear weapons. 
! Section 102 (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) (formerly section 670 of the FAA)
prohibits foreign economic or military assistance to countries that
deliver or receive nuclear reprocessing equipment, material, or
technology to or from another country; or any non-nuclear-weapon
state which illegally exports from the United States items that would
contribute to nuclear proliferation.  The President, who makes the
determination, can waive the sanction if he finds that ending
assistance would adversely affect U.S. nonproliferation objectives
or jeopardize the common defense and security.  The section further
prohibits assistance (except humanitarian or food assistance),
defense sales, export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items, other
export licenses subject to foreign policy controls, and various credits
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and loans to any country that the President has determined transfers
a nuclear explosive device, design information, or component to a
non-nuclear weapon state, or is a non-nuclear weapon state and
receives a nuclear device, design information, or component, or
detonates a nuclear explosive device.
Much of the language on nuclear nonproliferation controls that had been
incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act earlier (including the 1977 Glenn-
Symington amendments on enrichment and reprocessing and the1985 Pressler
amendment related to Pakistan) were incorporated into the AECA in 1994 by the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (see discussion below).
In the Senate-passed version of the Security Assistance Act of 2002  (H.R. 1646
EAS), Sec. 205 would amend section 40 d of the AECA (22 USC 2780(d)) to include
the transfer of chemical, biological and radiological agents in those activities
considered to be acts of international terrorism.
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA).  The Export Administration
Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) authorizes the executive branch to regulate private sector
exports of particular goods and technology to other countries.  Although the act
expired in 1994, its provisions have been continued under executive orders.31  The
EAA coordinates such actions with other foreign policy considerations, including
nonproliferation, and determines eligibility of recipients for exports.  Section 5 (50
U.S.C. app. 2404) authorizes the President to curtail or prohibit the export of any
goods or services for national security reasons: to comply with other laws regarding
a potential recipient country’s political status or political stability, to cooperate with
international agreements or understandings, or to protect militarily critical
technologies.  Section 6 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405) authorizes the President to curtail or
prohibit the export of goods or services for foreign policy reasons.  Within Section
6, for example, Section 6(j) establishes the State Department’s list of countries found
to be supporting acts of international terrorism, a list on which many other
restrictions and prohibitions in law are based.   The current Senate version of the bill
to reauthorize the EAA, S. 149, would shift the current authority to impose export
controls on items related to WMD proliferation from foreign policy controls to
national security controls.  As such, controls could be lifted if the items met foreign
availability and mass market criteria, irrespective of the foreign policy behavior of
the recipient state. Some critics maintain that this switch in categories would make
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Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.   The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945
(P.L. 79-173) establishes the Export-Import Bank of the United States and authorizes
the Bank to finance and facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of
commodities and services between the United States and foreign countries.  Key
nuclear-nonproliferation-related provisions were added in 1978.  These include
Section 2(b)(1)(B) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B)) and Section 2(b)(4) (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)),
which together allow the Bank to deny credit generally if that credit does not help
advance U.S. nuclear proliferation policy, and specifically, if a person or country has
a)  violated, abrogated or terminated a nuclear safeguards agreements; b) violated a
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States; or c) aided or abetted a non-
nuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to acquire
unsafeguarded special nuclear material.  There is a provision for presidential waiver.
(See Appendix B for details). 
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 was recently amended33 to allow denial
of Ex-Im Bank financing for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the
Arms Export Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or the
Export Administration Act of 1979,  extending its purview from strictly nuclear to
CW, BW, and missile-related concerns.  
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.   In 1994 Congress passed
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, (NPPA, Title VIII, of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, P.L. 103-236) which primarily
strengthened penalties against persons who aid or abet the acquisition of nuclear
weapons or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons materials, or countries (non-nuclear-
weapon-states) that obtain or explode nuclear devices. Sanctions include cutoff of
U.S. assistance, prohibition on involvement with U.S. government procurement,
stringent licensing requirements for technology exports, and opposition to loans or
credits from international financial institutions. These sanctions were imposed on
India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests in May 1998, but were gradually
relaxed. Legislation passed in the 106th Congress extended the President’s authority
to relax sanctions on India and Pakistan for a year, and the Senate passed a bill
suspending sanctions on the two countries for five years. The FY2000 Department
of Defense Appropriations bill (P.L. 106-79) extended the authority to suspend
sanctions. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush lifted all
remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan in response to support of U.S. operations
in Afghanistan.
The NPPA defined for the first time in U.S. law the term “nuclear explosive
device.” It defined “terrorism” as used in the AECA, to include activities that assist
groups or individuals to acquire any nuclear explosive device.  It included a sense of
Congress that identified 24 measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards, some of which
have been implemented.  Relevant sections include Section 821 (22 U.S.C. 3201
note), which requires U.S. government procurement sanctions; Section 823 (22
U.S.C. 3201 note), which requires U.S. executive directors of international financial
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institutions to vote against finance that might promote nuclear proliferation; and
Section 824 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note),which takes aim at financial institutions and
persons involved with financial institutions from assisting nuclear proliferation
through the provision of financing. (See Appendix B for specific details)
Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Legislation.  In
late 1991, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, which established programs
to assist with the safe and secure storage and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in
Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS).  These programs initially focused
on the “loose nukes” problem, but have broadened their focus to address a variety of
proliferation risks associated with weak political control over nuclear materials,
equipment, and expertise, as well as CW, BW, and missiles.  This effort has
expanded to include the CTR program in DoD and nonproliferation programs in
DOE and the State Department.34  In the FY2004 defense authorization act, there was
a provision to allow $50 million of unobligated funds to be spent on cooperative
threat reduction outside the former Soviet Union.  So far, the Bush administration has
proposed spending such funds in Iraq and Libya.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992.  Section 1602 of the
Defense Authorization for FY1993 (Title XVI, P.L. 102-484, as amended) extended
existing sanctions on Iraq to Iran.  The law states that it is the policy of the United
States to oppose any transfer to Iran or Iraq that could contribute to either country’s
ability to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons.
Section 1604 requires the President to impose sanctions against any person whom he
has determined to be engaged in such transfers.  Section 1605 similarly addresses
activities of foreign governments.  The 104th Congress amended the law (by passage
of section 1408(a), P.L. 104-106, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996) to make it apply to transfers contributing to the development of weapons of
mass destruction as well as advanced conventional weapons.  
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.  The law (P.L. 106-178)  imposes
penalties on countries whose companies help Iran’s efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and missile delivery systems.  This law covers all WMD.
Issues for the 109th Congress
Since September 11, 2001, much of Congress’s attention in the area of the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has focused on how to mitigate the
threat U.S. citizens face right now — improving domestic preparedness against
WMD terrorism and   improving intelligence capabilities to detect evidence of
proliferation-related activities.  Above all, however, most sources agree that the U.S.
government should continue to address nuclear proliferation at the source — securing
nuclear materials in Russia and the NIS and halting information flows from WMD-
knowledgeable scientists to countries of proliferation concern.
Other key nuclear nonproliferation issues for Congress  include:
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! implementing DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to
improve controls on nuclear materials, equipment, and expertise in
Russia and the NIS and expanding these efforts to countries outside
the NIS;
! monitoring efforts to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program;
! monitoring Iran’s nuclear program, including Russian and Chinese
nuclear exports and assistance;
! opposing the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and
preventing those countries from exporting WMD technology;
! strengthening the IAEA safeguards system to enforce the NPT and
maintaining the NPT;
! maintaining and expanding adherence to NSG nuclear export control
standards;
! curbing dangerous Chinese and Russian nuclear exports.
Closer to home, Congress will need to consider how to dispose of tons of excess
plutonium from dismantled Russian and U.S. warheads without increasing
proliferation risks; and how U.S. arms control and defense cooperation (particularly
missile defense cooperation) might affect proliferation risks.
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Proliferation Regime35
Prohibitions against the use of chemical weapons date back to the International
Peace Conferences that met at the Hague in 1899 and 1907; these pre-World War I
prohibitions were reaffirmed in the 1919 Versailles Treaty and further expanded in
the 1925 Geneva Protocol.  Although public horror at the nature of these weapons
rivals that accorded to nuclear weapons, it has been much more difficult to constrain
their proliferation and use.  They do not require as extensive an infrastructure as do
nuclear weapons and the technologies are much more widely disseminated.  In
addition, there has been a weaker consensus on the need to control these weapons,
in part because they are viewed as less destructive than nuclear weapons.  The
regimes that have grown up around these weapons, while not as extensive as the








The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) are the two primary treaties related to CBW
proliferation.  The United States is a State Party to both the BWC and the CWC.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Culminating 25 years of
negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention [http://www.opcw.org/html/db/
cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html]  opened for signature in January 1993.36  The CWC
entered into force on April 29, 1997, and there are 167 state parties, including the
United States.37
For states party to the treaty, the CWC prohibits the development, production,
stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.  The Convention mandates the
destruction of chemical weapon arsenals within 10 years of its coming into force.
The CWC also restricts the international transfer of chemicals deemed useful in the
production of chemical weapons, so-called “precursors.”  Most precursor chemicals
are dual-use, with legitimate peaceful applications.  The CWC establishes extensive
lists or “schedules” of precursors whose production, use, and transfer must be
reported to the CWC’s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW).  The schedules are designated I - III, in order of their potential usefulness
in chemical warfare.  Schedule I chemicals may be exported only to states parties
(i.e., nations that have ratified the CWC). In accordance with treaty provisions, as of
April 2000, the export of Schedule II chemicals to non-states parties became
prohibited, and the extension of these export restrictions to Schedule III chemicals
is under consideration.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Biological Weapons
Convention [http://www.opbw.org/] was concluded in 1972, with U.S. ratification
and entry in force in 1975.38  The BWC has 153 states parties.39  The Convention
bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins “of
types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.”  The
development, manufacture, and possession of BW weapons or delivery systems is
also prohibited.  States parties also agree not to transfer biological agents or toxins
for any but peaceful purposes.
In 1969, the United States declared a unilateral end to its offensive BW program
and suggested separating the BW issue from the chemical-biological arms control
negotiations in Geneva.  Negotiations on this proposal took only three years to




International Organizations.  The CBW nonproliferation regime relies on
the Australia Group and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) [http://www.opcw.org/], which was created by the CWC.  There is no
independent international organization to administer the Biological Weapons
Convention.  Data exchanges required by the BWC are carried out through the United
Nations, with the State Department as the international point of contact within the
U.S. government. 
 
Australia Group (AG).  In 1984, United Nations investigators officially
confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq War.  In response,
the United States and several other countries began to implement export controls on
chemicals that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.  In 1985, Australia
proposed that concerned countries meet in order to coordinate their export controls
and share information to enhance their effectiveness.  The first meeting took place
in June 1985, and biennial meetings continue at the Australian embassy in Paris.
The Australia Group [http://www.australiagroup.net/index_en.htm] has
established a list of chemicals and equipment that are subject to control.  In 1990, in
response to growing concerns over the proliferation of covert biological weapons
programs, certain biological agents and research/production equipment were added
to the control list. Australia Group guidelines do not call for prohibiting the export
of control list items, but rather establishing monitoring and licensing procedures,
with export denial only if there is reason to suspect potential contribution to a CBW
program.  The Group’s list does not curtail legitimate trade.
As  noted, the Australia Group does not have an independent administrative
organization.  National governments administer their own export control programs.
As an informal effort, it is not based on international treaty, is not affiliated with any
international organization, and has no independent administrative structure.  It
operates entirely upon consensus of its 38 members (see Appendix A), and its
decisions are not binding.  Countries are admitted to membership only upon the full
consensus of current members, and must have demonstrated compliance with the
CWC and BWC, and have an effective export control regime.
The Australia Group has  added controls on the transfer of information and
knowledge that could aid BW proliferation. These included “catch-all” constraints
covering items that are not on control lists, adding eight toxins to the control list,
adopting controls on technology associated with dual-use biological equipment, and
agreeing to control intangible technology transfer (i.e. by phone, fax, or internet) that
could be used to advance CBW programs.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
The OPCW is headquartered in The Hague.  It has four components:
! Conference  of  States Parties — Comprises all nations who have
ratified the Convention; meets annually; has the responsibility to
ensure compliance and levy sanctions; selects the Executive
Council;
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! Executive Council — Comprises 41 states parties on a two-year
rotation40; directs the routine administration of the OPCW;
! Technical Secretariat — Comprises a permanent international work
force; administers and monitors treaty compliance (inspections, data
collection and assessment);
! Scientific Advisory Board — Comprised of independent experts to
advise the OPCW on relevant scientific and technical issues.
U.S. Government Organizations.  In the United States, the following
offices, among others, participate in administering the CBW export control program,
with State serving as the international point of contact:
! Department of Commerce — Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau
of Industry and Security;
! Department of State — Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security — Bureau of Arms Control administers the
CWC and the Bureau of Nonproliferation administers export
controls;
! Department of Defense — Deputy Under-Secretary for Technology
Security Policy and Counterproliferation;
! The Department of the Treasury oversees U.S. embargoes through
its Office of Foreign Assets Control;
! The Department of Homeland Security enforces export control
through the U.S. Customs Service.
U.S. Laws41
U.S. laws pertaining to chemical and biological weapons proliferation include
statutes and executive orders, the most important of which are the Export
Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act.  These statutes operate on the
principle that licenses are required for the export of certain goods, and that it is
government policy to deny such licenses if there is a danger that the items will
contribute to CBW proliferation.  In addition, bills to implement the Chemical
Weapons Convention were  introduced in the 103rd Congress (S. 2221/H.R. 4849)
and the 104th Congress (S. 1732), though none was reported from committee.  In the
105th Congress, implementing legislation was incorporated into the FY1999 Omnibus
Appropriations Act, and signed into law October 20, 1998 (P. L. 105-277).
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Export Administration Act of 1979 .  (P.L. 96-72, Section 6(m) and 11C,
50 U.S.C. App. 2405m and 2410c).  This act requires a license for the export of dual-
use goods or technology that “would directly and substantially” assist CBW
proliferation.  Under the act, the Secretary of Commerce maintains a list of such
goods.  Exports to countries which have entered into an agreement for the control of
restricted goods (i.e. Australia Group members) are exempted from licensing
requirements.  The EAA requires the President to impose procurement and import
sanctions on foreign persons who contribute to CBW proliferation through exports.
Arms Export Control Act.  Section 81 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2798)
provides the State Department the authority to maintain licensing of the export of
chemical and biological agents and munitions.  It also provides criminal penalties for
violation and specifies sanctions against foreign persons who contribute to CW or
BW proliferation through exports, and against countries which use chemical or
biological weapons or make substantial preparations to do so.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991.42  This act mandates U.S. sanctions, and encourages
international sanctions, against countries that use chemical or biological weapons in
violation of international law.  Section 307 (22 U.S.C. 5605) requires the President
to terminate foreign assistance (except humanitarian, food, and agricultural
assistance) arms sales and licenses, credits, guarantees, and certain exports to a
government of a foreign country that he has determined has used or made substantial
preparation to use chemical or biological weapons.  Within three months, the
President must determine and certify to Congress that the government: is no longer
using chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law, is no longer
using such weapons against its own people, has provided credible assurances that
such behavior will not resume, and is willing to cooperate with U.N. or other
international observers to verify that biological and chemical weapons are not still
in use.  Without this three-month determination, sanctions are required affecting
multilateral development bank loans, U.S. bank loans or credits, exports, imports,
diplomatic relations, and aviation access to and from the United States.  The
President may lift the sanctions after a year, and may waive the imposition of these
sanctions.
Biological Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.  This act (P.L. 101-298)
implements the Biological Weapons Convention, providing criminal penalties for its
violation. It does not amend either the Export Administration Act or the Arms Export
Control Act.  For other laws and executive orders that apply to biological weapons
proliferation and U.S. nonproliferation policy, see the discussion of U.S. Laws in the
above section on the Australia Group.
Additional CW/BW Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in
Legislation.  Congress has expressed views on CW/BW nonproliferation policy
and U.S. government organization to implement those policies in several other laws.
CBW-related provisions have been included in the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
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Act of 1992, the Freedom Support Act, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act.
These and other provisions are listed in Appendix B. 
Issues for 109th Congress
Australia Group.  There are three significant current issues concerning the
Australia Group: (1) expansion of membership; (2) possible transhipment of
restricted commodities through AG members; and (3) the AG’s relationship to the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
The question of membership expansion has been a perennial one, as countries
seek AG membership to avoid the export controls imposed on non-members.  The
AG  has remained relatively small because of its inclusion only of countries seriously
dedicated to CBW non-proliferation and capable of maintaining an effective export
control regime.  Some have argued that extending membership to countries such as
Russia could provide greater leverage in encouraging export control improvements.
To date, however, AG members have not been persuaded that the advantages of such
action outweigh the potential for dilution of the regime’s effectiveness and new
obstacles to consensus-building.
The transhipment issue arises because AG members are exempted from the
export licensing requirements for restricted goods and technology.  Member states
assume that exports to AG members will be controlled by the receiving nation’s
export control regime once in that country and therefore are not subject to
unauthorized reshipment. Critics of this exemption maintain that, in practice,
monitoring unlicenced shipments is almost impossible, and that countries such as
Iran and Iraq have been able to elude export controls through multiple transhipments.
This controversy reflects the perpetual tension between nonproliferation controls and
the desire for unfettered commerce with major trading partners.  
In its last report addressing the Australia Group and other multilateral export
control regimes, the General Accountability Office found significant shortfalls in
information sharing among members regarding export licensing and verification that
members have implemented export controls.  For example, the United States had
failed to report 27 export license denials to AG members.43
The question of the Australia Group’s relationship to the Chemical Weapons
Convention revolves around the Convention’s Article XI which declares that states
parties will not:
maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any
international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken
under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the
development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge. ...
The Australia Group maintains that its export control regime is compatible
with the objectives of the Convention, and therefore not prohibited.  All AG
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members have agreed, however, to review their export controls to ensure they are
consistent with the Convention.  A number of developing countries, led by Iran (a
CWC state party), maintain that the AG controls should be dropped — particularly
for CWC states parties.  They view the controls as a tool of economic oppression on
the part of developed countries, even though no country has been able to provide an
example where AG controls have resulted in a denial of exports for legitimate
purposes.  This issue continues to be pressed within the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention.  Some provisions of the CWC’s
implementing legislation (P.L. 105-277) have raised concerns from CWC supporters.
These include
! Section 213 — sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation
from the U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary
information through the actions of OPCW employees.  Critics,
however, maintain that, as worded, this section does not place a high
enough burden of proof on the claimants, and consequently could
lead to excessive and unfounded claims against the government. To
date, no U.S. firm has sought compensation under this provision.
! Sections 237 — grants the President the right to deny a request for
inspection if it “may cause a threat to U.S. national security
interests.”  The CWC contains no provision permitting denial of an
inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the United
States in non-compliance.  They maintain that even if never
exercised, this section’s existence will encourage other nations to
enact similar exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verification
regime.
! Section 253 — exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC
control lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams
from reporting and inspection requirements.  This is intended to ease
potential burdens, particularly on paper manufacturers, but critics
believe the exemption is too broadly worded and would rule out an
effective non-intrusive sampling technique for inspectors. 
In early 2002, the Bush Administration led a successful effort to have Jose
Bustani removed as the Director-General of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat.
Citing “disdain for the OPCW Executive Committee” and inappropriate
administrative and budgetary policies among other charges, the State Department
made a concerted and sustained effort to gain support after Bustani refused to
voluntarily resign. On April 21, 2002 the Conference of OPCW State Parties voted
48-7, with 43 abstentions to support the U.S. position and on July 25, 2002,
Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter was confirmed as the OPCW’s new Director-General.
Though the United States attributed the OPCW’s fiscal difficulties to DG
Bustani’s mismanagement, others have pointed to the U.S. and Russia’s repeated
delinquency in annual dues payments and inspection cost reimbursements as having
contributed significantly to the OPCW’s budget shortfalls.  In 2002, the United States
refused to support a budget increase to address a backlog of inspections, and was
successful in having its pro-rated portion of the annual dues reduced from 25% to
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22%.  These actions have raised questions among CWC supporters concerning the
U.S. commitment to the OPCW.  However, with a new Director General overseeing
the OPCW, the United States approved an overall OPCW budget increase of 6.7%
for 2004, for a total budget to $86.5 million.  For 2005, the OPCW administration
proposed a 4.8% budget increase, which would have resulted in a 4.3% increase in
national assessments.  The OPCW’s Executive Council, of which the United States
is a member, reduced these increases to 3.5% and 2.9% respectively.  The resulting
total OPCW 2005 budget is 75.8 million Euros ($97.7 million), of which the United
States assessment is 16.7 million Euros ($21.5).  The OPCW 2005 budget is evenly
split between verification costs and administrative costs.
Biological Weapons Convention.  For most of the 1990s, BWC state
parties sought ways to address the BWC’s lack of compliance verification and
enforcement provisions.  The most extensive effort to draft an adaptation protocol
regarding these issues all but collapsed at the last BWC Review Conference in
November 2001.  After six years of negotiation, the United States declared the
adaptation protocol draft unacceptable, and rejected it as a basis for further
negotiation.  In rejecting the draft protocol, the Bush Administration stated that 
The draft Protocol will not improve our ability to verify BWC compliance. It will
not enhance our confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those
countries seeking to develop biological weapons. In our assessment, the draft
Protocol would put national security and confidential business information at
risk44
At the same time, the United States introduced a number of proposals which it
suggested that nations undertake on a unilateral basis to enhance biological weapons
non-proliferation.  These were
! Enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited BW
activities with strong extradition requirements; 
! Establish an effective United Nations procedure for investigating
suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use;
! Establish procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns; 
! Commit to improving international disease control and to enhance
mechanisms for sending expert response teams to cope with
outbreaks;
! Establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and
genetic engineering of pathogenic organisms; 
! Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of
ethical conduct that would have universal recognition; and 
! Promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and
shipment of pathogenic organisms. 
In the wake of the United States statement, the Review Conference was unable
to reach consensus on a final conference declaration.  Many in the arms control
community criticized the U.S. position as “self-imposed isolation from the
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mainstream of BWC diplomacy.”45  In light of continued U.S. opposition, the
chairman of the November 2002 Review Conference presented a minimal program,
emphasizing only annual meetings to discuss strengthening national laws and ways
to respond to BW attacks.  The United States, which did not attend the review
conference, endorsed this work program.  Participants will reconvene in 2006. 
As with the CWC, many developing nations, again headed by Iran, are seeking
removal of Australia Group controls and increased biotechnical cooperation in
exchange for accepting any enhancements to the BWC.
Missile Proliferation Control Regime46
In the early 1980s, the United States and its allies became concerned over the
rapid spread of missiles as the advanced industrial nations’ monopoly on missile
technology gave way to a diffusion of missiles and missile technology throughout
much of the world.   In April 1987, the United States, Canada, France, West
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom created the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering
nuclear weapons.  Thirty-four countries are now partners in the MTCR.47  In addition,
China, Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic have agreed to observe the MTCR
guidelines but without becoming partners of the  regime.  Israel additionally has
completed a memorandum of understanding with the United States affirming its
commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines.
The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition and development
of missiles can be delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers
agree to control exports of missiles and the equipment and technology used in missile
production.  The MTCR is similar in this regard to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.  It differs from the nuclear,
chemical, and biological non-proliferation regimes in that the MTCR is not supported
by a treaty and has no international organization to verify or enforce compliance.
Rather, the MTCR is a set of common export control guidelines adopted and
administered independently by each of the partner nations. 
The specific missile equipment and technology subject to the guidelines is
described in an annex to the MTCR Guidelines and divided into two categories.
Each of the member countries is to exercise particular restraint in considering
transfers of items in Category I which include complete rocket systems and
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems capable of delivering a 500- kilogram (1,100-
pound) payload to a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) or more, and complete
subsystems of such missiles and vehicles.  There is a strong presumption to deny
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48  According to the guidelines, the government judgment on the likely use of the missile items
will be made, 
on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors
including...
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the
recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery
systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances
of the recipient states...; and 
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
transfers of these systems and components.  The guidelines further state the transfer
of Category I production facilities will not be authorized.  Export restraints are to
be applied to Category II items, which consist of other components, equipment,
material, and technology that would be usable in the production of missiles and
UAVs.  Category II also includes, at item number 19, complete rocket systems and
UAVs with a 300-km range but not capable of delivering a 500-kg payload to that
range (as covered by Category I), and in item number 20, individual rocket stages and
rocket engines and production equipment usable for systems with a range of 300 km
with less than a 500-kg payload.
In January 1993, MTCR partners revised the guidelines to limit the risks of
proliferation of missile delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction:
chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons.  The guidelines now
call for particular restraint and the presumption to deny transfers of any missiles
(whether or not they are included in the annex) and of any items in the annex if the
government judges that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of
mass destruction.48  This addition is commonly referred to as a “catch-all” clause.
  
The MTCR has undergone a transformation from a small group of Western
industrial countries to a more inclusive group of countries.  Argentina, with its
Condor II missile program, was originally one of the primary targets of the Regime,
but it terminated development of Condor II and is now a full partner in the MTCR.
South Africa and Brazil had active missile programs but are now partners.  Whereas
the Soviet Union was the primary source for missiles to the Third World in the 1970s
and 1980s, Russia has become a partner in the MTCR, although the United States has
sanctioned Russian organizations for improper exports to Iran.  China has been, and
still is, another significant supplier of missiles and missile technology to developing
countries but committed to observing the MTCR guidelines and pledged not to
transfer surface-to-surface missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds.  In spite of these
commitments, Russian and Chinese organizations and individuals continue to supply
components and technical assistance for missile production.  
North Korea has become the primary supplier of missiles and missile technology
to developing countries.  Iran, Syria, India, and Pakistan are the other countries of
major concern regarding the development and acquisition of missiles.  Missile
programs in China, Egypt, and South Korea have also caused concern in Washington.
Cruise missiles have always been included with ballistic missiles and space-launch
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49 U.S. Department of State,  Reprint of White House Press Release, Non-Proliferation and
Export Control Policy, September 27, 1993.
50 John R. Bolton, Remarks at the Launching Conference for the ICOC, The Hague, The
Netherlands, November 25, 2002.  See [http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15488.htm]
vehicles in the MTCR but are now receiving greater attention as advanced propulsion
and guidance technology is becoming more widely available.
The United States long ago stated its support for expanding membership of the
MTCR “to include additional countries that subscribe to international non-
proliferation standards, enforce effective export controls, and abandon offensive
ballistic missile programs.”49  The United States will not support space launch
programs in non-MTCR countries but will consider exports of MTCR items for use
in space-launch programs by MTCR countries on a case-by-case basis.  The United
States and other MTCR countries are promoting regional efforts to reduce the
demand for missiles and persuade countries to forgo the acquisition of missiles.
Some nations have not joined the MTCR, affirming their sovereign right to
acquire, develop, deploy, and export missiles.  It has been particularly difficult to
control dual-use technologies which may be used for civilian space launch vehicles,
civil aviation, general industry, and tactical weapons.  MTCR member states have
been working since about 1999 on a complementary effort which has become known
as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
On November 25, 2002, the ICOC entered into force and the United States was an
initial subscribing member. The Code includes broad principles, general
commitments and modest confidence-building measures.  The United States sees the
ICOC  as “an important addition to the wide range of tools available to countries to
impede and roll back this proliferation threat.”50  The code attempts to fill the gap of
demand-side incentives by offering “cooperation” with respect to civilian space-
launch vehicle technology in exchange for significant nonproliferation commitments.
However, such cooperation is to be worked out between states and is not specified
in the draft document, making incentives for cooperative appear a bit elusive.
Implementing the Regime
International Organization.  While the MTCR has no international
organization, partner countries hold monthly meetings in Paris among embassy
representatives (called “points of contact” meetings), hold technical experts’
meetings (including information exchanges) and convene a plenary once each year.
In this manner, partners revise the guidelines and the equipment annex and admit
new partners.  
U.S. Government Organization.  The Office of Defense Trade Controls of
the State Department administers the regulations governing the export of items on the
Munitions List — those items that are subject to controls under the AECA and the
ITAR.  The Bureau of Industry and Security in the U.S. Department of Commerce
administers the regulations governing the export of items on the Commerce Control
List — those items that are primarily for civilian use but have applications for the
development, testing, or production of missiles.
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The Missile Technology Export Control Committee is an interagency group,
chaired by a State Department official, that reviews controversial missile export
license cases.  The Missile Trade Analysis Group, another interagency group chaired
by a State Department representative, reviews intelligence reports on diversions of
missile technology from legitimate recipients to others.
Officials in the State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation and regional
bureaus also undertake diplomatic initiatives to dissuade additional nations from
developing missiles, to persuade other countries to adopt export controls on missile
technology, and to reduce the perceived need for missiles.
Department of Defense officials have established a counter-proliferation policy
that addresses export controls, security relationships with friendly and hostile
countries, defensive and offensive military operational concepts, and equipment.
Many organizations within the Department implement the various aspects of the
counter-proliferation policy, but the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Policy has the primary responsibility for counter-proliferation policy formulation.
The Department of the Treasury also oversees U.S. embargoes through its
Office of Foreign Assets Control, and helps enforce export controls through the U.S.
Customs Service.
U.S. Laws51
The United States has maintained stringent controls on missiles and missile
technology under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 121, hereafter the ITAR).
In the early 1980s,  the United States also unilaterally adopted tighter export
controls on dual-use equipment and technology that could benefit foreign missile
programs.  Dual-use controls have been placed in the Export Administration
Regulations (15 C.F.R. 730-799) pursuant to the authority of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.) and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).  Successive
administrations have updated regulations to reflect changes adopted by the MTCR,
changes in U.S. law, and the changing international political environment.  The
Export Administration Act of 1979 has expired several times, but the President has
invoked his authority to continue in effect the system of controls that had been
maintained under the act.  
Members of Congress became interested in missile proliferation in the mid-
1980s because of evidence of Third World missile development and acquisition
programs and because the developing threat was an additional consideration in
funding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, a Reagan-era program that funded
research into ballistic missile defenses).  Libya had purchased Soviet Scud missiles
and Iran and Iraq were firing missiles at each other.  Congress had little or no
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involvement in shaping the MTCR, since it was neither a treaty nor an executive
agreement.  Soon after the Regime was announced in April 1987, it became apparent
that companies and individuals from a number of MTCR member countries (such as
West Germany, Italy, Britain, and France) were transferring goods and technical
assistance to missile development teams in Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Egypt, and
elsewhere.  In 1987, the United States also learned that China had transferred
intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia.  Many Members of Congress thought
the MTCR needed enforcement mechanisms, additional members, and stricter
compliance.
Several bills were introduced in the 101st Congress with the intention of
strengthening the U.S. position on missile nonproliferation.  Several bills that
included sanctions against nations, companies, and individuals who violate the
MTCR guidelines gained widespread bipartisan congressional support.  Bush
Administration officials maintained that the President already had sufficient authority
to reprimand or sanction foreign governments, companies, and individuals for
inappropriate missile transfers and objected to the imposition of mandatory statutory
sanctions.  President Bush pocket-vetoed the Export Administration Act of 1990,
which included a missile nonproliferation provision, as well as the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control Act.  However, he signed the defense authorization bill
that contained a nearly identical section on missile nonproliferation policy.
The Missile Technology Control Act of 1990.  The act became law in the
101st Congress (H.R. 4739, Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510).  It added Chapter 7 to the Arms Export Control
Act, sections 6(l) and 11B to the Export Administration Act of 1979, and established
an annual reporting requirement.  Chapter 7 of the AECA has been amended several
times.
The Arms Export Control Act.  (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)  Chapter 7 of the
AECA requires the President to impose sanctions on U.S. and foreign individuals
who improperly conduct trade in controlled missile technology.  If a person
inappropriately transfers MTCR Category II goods or technology, he/she will be
denied, for two years, any U.S. Government contracts relating to missile equipment
or technology, and U.S. export licenses for missile equipment and technology.  The
AECA requires sanctions for at least two years if a person inappropriately transfers
Category I items; these include denial of all U.S. Government contracts and export
licenses for any item on the U.S. Munitions List.  If the President determines that a
foreign person has substantially contributed to the design, development, or
production of missiles by a non-MTCR country, he shall prohibit for at least two
years U.S. imports of items produced by that person.  The act includes presidential
waivers, exclusions, determination requirements, and definitions that allow the
Administration to take no action in certain circumstances.
These sanctions may be waived by the President, and they generally do not
apply to transfers of missile goods or technology to an MTCR adherent or from an
MTCR adherent.  The United States has imposed missile sanctions against entities
in several countries including China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, Iran,
Russia, India, Syria, and Egypt.
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The Export Administration Act of 1979.  (Sections 6 (l) and 11B, 50
U.S.C.  app. 2405 and app. 2410b). Similarly, the EAA requires controls on U.S.
missile-related exports and sanctions against U.S. and foreign persons who
improperly transfer dual-use goods or technology listed in the MTCR annex.  If a
person improperly transfers Category II goods or technology, he will be denied export
licenses for two years for missile equipment and technology controlled under the
EAA.  If a person improperly exports Category I goods or technology, he will be
denied export licenses for at least two years for all items controlled under the EAA.
If a foreign person exports goods or technology that substantially contribute to the
design, development, or production of missiles in a non-MTCR country, he will be
denied license to import his products into the United States for at least two years.
Actions that trigger sanctions under the provisions of either the AECA or the EAA,
require commensurate sanctions under the other act.
Additional Missile Nonproliferation Policy Provisions in Legislation.
Over the years, Congress has called for additional sanctions, expressed views on
nonproliferation policies related to missiles or advanced conventional weapons, and
expressed views on the organization of the U.S. Government to implement those
policies in several other laws.  There are provisions related to missile proliferation
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, the
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the Freedom Support Act, and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act.  These and other laws are listed in Appendix B.
In the 108th Congress, Representative Lantos introduced H.R. 1875, the Missile
Threat Reduction Act, which called for an internationally legally binding agreement
(presumably to strengthen the MTCR), $250M in funds for technical assistance and
destruction of missile programs, and strengthened sanctions against missile
proliferation.  The bill remained in the House International Relations Committee.
Issues for 109th Congress
A perennial problem is whether the MTCR and the associated U.S. sanctions are
effective enough to warrant the economic and political costs to the United States, and
whether additional or alternative feasible measures would increase effectiveness.  
Many analysts consider the MTCR a successful vehicle of quiet diplomacy.  The
MTCR has been credited with slowing missile development in Brazil and India, and
blocking a collaborative program of Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq to build the Condor
missile.  This missile would have been a significant improvement over the Scud-
based missiles used by Iraq in the Gulf War.  Russia and China have probably
stopped exporting entire missiles that fall under the parameters of the MTCR, but
continue to transfer components and technology.  Most European countries and Asian
allies have tightened their export control laws and some have prosecuted individuals
who have smuggled missile technology as well as nuclear and chemical production
technology.  Accurate long-range missiles are expensive and difficult to develop and
produce.  Because most countries cannot produce and integrate all of the
sophisticated components required, the MTCR and complementary export controls
will probably continue to impede development of the most advanced missiles.
However, much of the international commerce in missiles and missile
technology occurs between nations that do not adhere to MTCR guidelines.  China
CRS-40
52 Testimony given by Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Proliferation Controls in a hearing before Senate Government Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, June 11, 2002.
and North Korea are not members, although China promised to observe the
guidelines after the United States had twice imposed economic sanctions on Chinese
companies for transferring missile items to Pakistan, on the condition that the United
States would lift those sanctions.  North Korea’s missile development, production,
deployment, and export of missiles has apparently not been hindered by the MTCR.
In particular, North Korean exports of missile production technology to Iran,
Pakistan, Syria, and Egypt seriously undercut the international standards and goals
of the Regime.  In the view of some analysts, the activities of North Korea
demonstrate the failure of the MTCR.
Some difficulties associated with the nuclear, chemical, and biological
nonproliferation regimes may be even more acute with respect to missile technology.
The notion of a suppliers’ regime dividing the world into “haves” and have-nots” is
even more exacerbated in the case of missiles, since there is no treaty and no quid pro
quo for the have-nots. The International Code of Conduct is an attempt to address
this “carrot” side of the carrot-stick equation, but the lack of specificity on incentives
is viewed by some as too limited and by others as too potentially expansive.  Also,
there is a common perception that technology is shared among MTCR members,
although the guidelines call for the strong presumption of denial of Category I-class
missiles and technology to anyone.  The U.S. decision in 2002 to elaborate what
constitutes “rare occasions” (wherein Category I presumption of denials could be
overruled) lends credence to this view.52  
Further, while many of the materials associated with nuclear weapons can be
identified and controlled, the materials and components used in missiles are
commonly used in a wide range of commercial manufacturing processes.  Ballistic
missiles can be nearly indistinguishable from civilian space launch vehicles, and
some missile production equipment, technology, and materials are difficult to
distinguish from civilian items.  This is particularly acute in the case of UAVs.
As developing nations become increasingly capable of producing missiles
indigenously, the effectiveness of supplier controls is gradually being eroded.  A
growing list of nations now produce ballistic missiles and are increasingly less
dependent on imported materials.  Some analysts see attempts to control missile
technology exports as futile and argue for the fewest export restrictions possible,
emphasizing the importance to the U.S. economy of exports. Others say the U.S.
Government should not allow the export of any goods that are likely to harm U.S.
national security, despite the potential effect on some American business interests.
In addition to the promotion of exports, other foreign policy and national
security goals may also compete with missile nonproliferation for government
attention and action.  For instance, U.S. leaders hope to encourage Russia and China
to become stable and responsible actors in their regions and in the international
community, to pursue economic and  political reforms, and to respect internationally
recognized human rights.  The United States seeks the cooperation of those two
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countries and many others in efforts to block nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug
trafficking, and organized crime.  Although missile nonproliferation will remain an
issue of utmost importance, other goals may occasionally be given greater emphasis.
However, when political leaders suspend missile nonproliferation policies in favor
of other goals, the credibility of the U.S. missile policy and that of the MTCR are
damaged.  It can become more difficult to persuade other countries to comply with
a set of standards when the United States appears to enforce the standards on a
selective basis.  The priority to be given to missile nonproliferation has occasionally
been a point of contention between Congress and the administration.
Congress has established economic sanctions that must be imposed on
companies that trade in missile technology contrary to the MTCR guidelines.  The
imposition, lifting, and waiving of these sanctions frequently cause controversy.
Some analysts suggest these negative actions should be coupled with positive
incentives to induce countries to refrain from proliferation.  Positive incentives could
include trade credits, development assistance, military assistance, technology
transfers, access to space launch and satellite capabilities, or security guaranties.  But
other analysts contend the security benefits derived from adhering to the MTCR
should be sufficient and that the United States should not try to buy compliance.
According to many foreign policy specialists, the underlying political and
security problems that drive proliferation must be resolved before meaningful curbs
can be applied to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.  The
United States and its partners in the MTCR have helped countries, particularly
neighbors in regions of ongoing conflict, to adopt confidence-building measures such
as those that have contributed to security and cooperation in Europe.  They also try
to help correct regional imbalances of military forces and to facilitate peace
negotiations and arms control talks.
Security alliances and military assistance can play a role in restraining missile
development.  The U.S. security umbrella over Western Europe and parts of Asia and
the transfer of large quantities of advanced conventional weapons helped to dissuade
a number of U.S. allies from developing weapons of mass destruction and helped
deter aggression.  Some analysts contend that the security of some allies was
enhanced by the deterrent power of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles previously deployed
in their territory or, possibly in the case of Israel, by indigenous weapons.  The U.S.
Government has also decided that it is appropriate to sell missiles (U.S. Army
Tactical Missile Systems) with a potential range of 250 km to Turkey, Greece, South
Korea, Britain, France, and Germany, though it forbids sales of missiles with a range
of 300 km.  However, the superiority of U.S. military technology may actually
persuade some adversary countries to develop weapons of mass destruction and
missiles as their best means of deterring U.S. intervention.
Some analysts see missile defense systems as a proper alternative to export
controls, though most see them as supplementing other military, political, and
economic measures (including export controls and sanctions).  The United States will
probably deploy theater and national missile defense systems and has provided
defensive missiles to some allies in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.  As the
United States seeks to increase defense cooperation in the area of missile defenses,
issues could arise about the applicability of MTCR guidelines.  One particular case
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where questions have arisen is the proposed transfer of Arrow missile defense
systems from Israel to India, which requires U.S. approval.53  Air defense missiles
and anti-theater ballistic missiles probably enhance the security of U.S. allies, but
none are expected to be 100 percent effective.  In some cases, such as Taiwan,
deployments might increase tensions.  The Administration and Congress will have
to weigh carefully defense policy objectives against nonproliferation policy
objectives in this area.
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Appendix A.  Proliferation Control
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United Kingdom* United Kingdom United Kingdom
United States* United States United States
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Appendix B.  Additional Legislation and 
Executive Orders
Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title
VII, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P. L. 104-293, 50
U.S.C. 2301 note.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Title XVI, Arms
Control Matters, Nonproliferation Provisions, P. L. 103-160.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Title XV, Arms
Control Matters, Nonproliferation Provisions, P. L. 103-337; 22 U.S.C.
2751 note.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992, Title XV, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.  L. 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a
begins at section 1505 of Act.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Title V, Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons Restrictions, P.L. 104-132, 18 U.S.C.
831 note, and 2331, 42 U.S.C. 262 note, 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994, Title VIII, Part A,
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995,
P.L. 103-236, 22 U.S.C. 2551 note.
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-
201, 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
Executive Order 13222 (August 17, 2001, 66 FR 44025, August 22, 2001
Continuation of Export Control Regulations.
Continued on August 15, 2002 by notice published in Federal
Register on August 16, 2002.
Executive Order 13049 (June 11, 1997, 62 FR 32471) Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Executive Order 13030 Administration of Foreign Assistance and Arms
Exports  (December 12, 1996, 61 FR 66187).
Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994, 59 F.R. 59-9, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) Declares the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery as an unusual and extraordinary threat and
declares a national emergency to deal with that threat.
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Amended by EO 13094 (July 28, 1998, 63 FR40803 and by EO
13128 (June 25, 1999, 64 FR 34703).
Executive Order 12946 (January 20, 1995, 60 F.R. 4829, 22 U.S.C. 2551
note) Establishes the President’s Advisory Board on Arms
Proliferation Policy.
Executive Order 12851 (June 11, 1993, 58 F.R. 33181, 22 U.S.C. 2797
note) Delegates President’s authority under the Export Administration
Act, Arms Control Export Act, and the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control, Warfare Elimination Act, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, and Foreign Relations
Authorizations Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, to the Secretaries
of State, Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, and Director of ACDA.
Executive Order 11850 (April 8, 1975, 40 F.R. 16187, 50 U.S.C. 1511 note)
Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot
control agents
